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Introduction
This chapter reflects on what materiality-inflected methodologies1 can bring to 
an anthropology of law, and to legal studies more generally. Its starting point is an 
increasing attention across the social sciences and humanities for objects, and think-
ing beyond the human. These have often, but not only, emerged from science and 
technology studies (STS), to which we pay particular attention. However, approaches 
to materiality have themselves become diversified, and their implications for law can 
similarly be read in multiple ways. At the same time, legal anthropology has helped to 
re-characterise the complexity of law as a field of social activity by paying attention 
to its meanings, for actors within as well as outside its own institutions; to its modes of 
action in practice, again within its explicitly designated spaces as well as its everyday; 
to its unexpected forms, patterns and directions; to its multiplicity and uncertainty. 
Approaches within a broadly defined ‘legal anthropology’ agenda have provided tools 
to move away from grand and removed theorisation of the law, or an exclusive atten-
tion to its own claims, and towards a subtler understanding of law as a relatively fluid, 
changing and uncertain set of practices. While doing so, legal anthropology has also 
reminded us of the significance of empirical research to identify and theorise the 
complex existences of law, a contribution which echoes some of the implications of 
materiality-oriented theories.
In this chapter, we seek to move these developments on by making two distinct 
but related contributions: first, to explore the various trends of ‘posthuman’ under-
standings of law, and propose that their key contribution is to enable us to push the 
boundaries of law as a social phenomenon; second, by putting posthuman approaches 
to legality in conversation with legal anthropology, we do so to argue that one of 
the strengths of materiality-inflected approaches to law has been its attention to the 
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micro-details of law’s unexpected workings, which will continue to need careful, 
critical, empirical attention.
On their face, these contributions are not particularly startling. However, the pace 
at and thoughtfulness with which the developments have occurred have led to some 
tracks which need jumping (to adopt Sassen’s metaphor (2006: 8)) and to a period 
of cross-disciplinary reflection. Our basic argument is that we need to be clear about 
some of the core terms and that, once we are, the claims of some contributions need 
to be modified. The particular core term with which we are concerned, as this chap-
ter develops, is law, not in a basic doctrinal excursus (although, in itself, such work 
would make for a fascinating study of law-on-law replication: see Blomley, 2014) but 
as an ontological and epistemological problematic. We no longer adhere to a crude 
binary of materialism and idealism, for, as Conaghan (2016: 29) suggests,
Matter matters because it plays an active role in processes of meaning and appre-
hension. In this sense, epistemology, as currently understood, must give ground to 
ontology, including new investigations of the ontological premises upon which 
critical thinking, particularly that characterised by the cultural or linguistic turn, 
has been based.
Materiality and ‘the social’
The contributions of materiality-inflected approaches to law can be articulated at 
two levels, at least. On the one hand, they redirected attention to the significance 
of ‘things’ or objects, in social practices, and social analysis. On the other hand, this 
attention to materiality has facilitated an influential revisiting of ‘the social’ as rela-
tional, fluid and contingent. In this chapter, we are particularly interested in those 
broader implications of materiality-inflected approaches on social theory, and in turn 
on conceptualisations of law as a social actor. Of course, those two elements cannot 
be dissociated, and paying attention to materials was, in itself, an important step. As 
detailed from the late 1970s by proponents of actor network theory (ANT; Latour 
and Woolgar, 1986; Callon, 1984), objects are not just essential to the constitution of 
the social, they are also mutually constitutive. Indeed, drawing firm lines between 
humans and objects was a wrong turn in social theory because humanity is con-
stantly shaped and mediated by an infinite series of devices, from papers or bricks to 
computers and microchips. Latour’s classic, ironic and pseudonymous study of the 
“sociology of the door closer” (Johnson, 1988) emphasises this problematic. Zooming 
out from this discussion of the piston automatic door closer, he argues (1988: 303) 
that “The label ‘inhuman’ applied to techniques simply overlooks translation mech-
anisms and the many choices that exist for figuring or de-figuring, personifying or 
abstracting, embodying or disembodying actors.” The dividing line between people 
and things is negotiable and negotiated.
Materials themselves are complex, both in their histories and making, as well as in 
their deployment. Jane Bennett (2010) draws on the vibrancy of matter as a constit-
uent of politics. As she puts it, her “aspiration [was] to articulate a vibrant materiality 
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that runs alongside and inside humans to see how analyses of political events might 
change if we gave the force of things more due” (2010: viii). Callon (1984) reminds 
us of the dependency of humans and non-humans by observing the negotiations that 
take place between fishermen and scallops in Brittany. His was not a study of the 
exercise of human power, knowledge and achievement, of a straightforward percep-
tion of power of one over the other, or even clear boundaries between their roles and 
actions. Instead, it was a study of translations, as he put it, through problematisations, 
interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. Although no doubt over-structured and 
programmatic, in each of these modes of action, the human and non-human agents 
(or ‘actants’ to borrow from the ANT vocabulary) produced an unchoreographed 
dance, through which the biologists were seeking to choreograph the collection of 
scallops. Anne-Marie Mol (2003) opens up this complexity further, by emphasising 
the multiplicity of individual agents in social processes, where even an apparently 
fixed material being is in fact deployed across a variety of ontological choreographies. 
For Law and Mol (1995: 287):
Materiality is decentred: so suggest our stories about strategies. Better, materi-
alities are decentered. There are multiple materialities performing themselves in 
manifold ways.
In their analysis, the apparently shocking conclusion is that matter is a set of relations 
which at different times becomes durable. Here, they hint at another key assumption 
of materiality-inflected approaches: the idea that materialities do not pre-exist social 
relations, but are always produced by them. For Haraway “objects are boundary proj-
ects” (2007: 126).
Thinking about materiality, of course, has implications for thinking about being 
humans, and, as a first step, for thinking about bodies. Haraway’s work (1991, 2007) is 
particularly important here, in thinking about bodies per se, and in turn about some 
of the politics of being human. As she reimagines humans as ‘cyborgs’, she makes both 
an observation and a political statement: humans are all socio-technological hybrids, 
though maybe more visibly so as technological advancements transform the limits 
of human bodies; but at the same time thinking about ourselves as hybrid enables us 
to move away from loaded political categorisations. Revisiting how we think of the 
relationship between bodies, materials, social relations and their co-production rather 
than co-existence forms the basis of her critical reflexions on sexual difference and 
feminism.
Bodies in materiality-inflected theories present a degree of ambivalence as social 
agents and are a good illustration of the implications of thinking about materiality 
for thinking about boundary-making. They are particularly complex sites of social 
and political interactions and have become loaded with meaning in ways that are 
almost always impossible to disentangle. They are political hybrids. At the same time, 
materiality-inflected theories remind us of the non-uniqueness of bodies as social 
objects – characteristics are shared with other organisms, other relations, other sites, 
while constantly dependent on the complexity of each of these. Rethinking the 
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workings of medicines or space, for example, requires us to re-trace some of the pro-
cesses at stake in making up these things, in negotiating forms of situated knowledges 
(and their strategies for broader claim-making); but also to retrace the complexity of 
organisms both on their own and as parts of the broader techno-scientific machin-
ery. Here, the ins and outs of bodies are constantly negotiated, as is the inherence of 
medicine or space as a field of knowledge, and of its relationship to plants, cultures, 
buildings, devices etc. (e.g., Fassin, 2007; Biehl, 2013; Langwick, 2011; Blomley, 2016).
Haraway’s attention to bodies also enables her to set an agenda for feminist reflec-
tions on the production of situated knowledge. Paying attention to the situatedness 
of knowledge also suggests a more general move away from universal claims towards 
attention to the micro and always limited, fractal, movements and interactions – a 
point, both political and methodological, to which we return below, but that for now 
can be summarised as follows:
I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision, and so reclaim the 
sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body, and 
into a conquering gaze from nowhere. This is the gaze that mythically inscribes 
all the marked bodies, and that makes the unmarked category claim the power to 
see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation. This gaze signi-
fies the unmarked positions of Man and White.
(2007: 114)
Law and materialities
How then do such studies translate into thinking about law? At one level, such a 
translation should be smooth, as the workings of law are heavily dependent on mate-
rials of all kinds – from the spaces of courtrooms and their peculiar furnishing, to the 
multiple documents and forms that circulate to ‘make law happen’, to the very objects 
that law conditions (from houses to medicines). This attention to the ‘things’ of law 
has opened up fresh insights into the everyday workings of legal processes. Artefacts 
as lively beings of negotiations between actors in legal processes have been at the 
forefront of this attention. In his analysis of the Conseil d’Etat, Latour (2013) demon-
strates the inherent entanglement of materials in the making of decision by judges. 
Plenty of other studies have opened up new and exciting research in which artefacts 
are front and centre of the analysis. From consent forms (Jacob and Riles, 2007) to 
legal files (Van Orschoot and Schinkel, 2015), from leases (Hunter, 2015) to patents 
(Cloatre, 2013), from international agreements (Riles, 2006) to courtrooms (Mulcahy, 
2010), through to the very constitution of bureaucracies (Hull, 2012), researchers 
have become adept at following the complex roles of artefacts through legal processes. 
More than neutral intermediaries, these paper-actants have become framed as essen-
tial constituents of the orders that law is seen to generate.
But law does not just rely on such materials and artefacts; it also relies on their 
reproducibility across space and time. A document can be an artefact that functions 
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as “ ‘a technique for interesting’ ” (Freeman and Maybin, 2011: 160; see also Latour 
and Woolgar, 1986: 45–50); such documents “anticipate and enable certain actions 
by others – extensions, amplifications, and modifications of both content and form” 
(Riles, 2006: 21). Further,
the document is a translation that also translates. It is intrinsic to those commu-
nicative processes in which actors inhabiting different social worlds first enter 
into relations with each other and then begin to recast or reconstruct themselves, 
their interests and their worlds. This means simply that the document connects 
actors and coordinates their actions.
(Freeman and Maybin, 2011: 165)
The production and proliferation in our libraries and on the spaces of the inter-
net of template documents and macros, contractual terms and conditions, which 
translate law into our everyday lives, are perhaps the clearest illustration of this 
reproducibility (Radin, 2012). This reproducibility is a key element in the ways 
in which law achieves its status. The standardisation of things makes an array of 
new techniques possible. And the standardisation of legal documents are crucial 
technologies in private legal infrastructures as “devices through which particular 
technical, institutional, political, legal, and economic arrangements fain solidity and 
durability” (Riles, 2011: 46).
However, we should not rest solely on such physical artefacts but also the appar-
ent truths that they convey. Generations of constitutional lawyers have given us the 
idea of the rule of law that has been repeatedly inscribed and has become ritualised 
in public life. We argue that the very idea of the rule of law operates as a “material 
semiotic” (Law and Mol, 1995: 280–281) through which, as a durable metaphor, it 
has proudly come to symbolise the essence of Western democratic thought, despite 
its evident flaws. Attention to materiality as it is translated into law suggests that, in 
order to get a grip on legal phenomena, we must pay attention to the role of things in 
shaping, or mediating, interactions. Focusing on materiality in law therefore enables 
objects to become re-thought as complex blackboxes, that can be opened up to ques-
tion despite being seemingly uneventful moments of everyday social life.
But as we previously stated, focusing on matter is always about more than simply 
bringing objects into social analysis: it is about re-questioning networks, relations and 
events through the opening of what goes as unseen and unquestioned in the constitu-
tion of social life. It is this level of analysis which particularly matters to us, notably the 
conceptual ramifications or implications of materiality scholarship for critical engage-
ments with law. It would be a mistake to understand the import of materiality to law 
as being only about a renewed attention to things. Focusing critically on materiality 
also enables the re-thinking of other concepts or processes of significance to, and in, 
law, layering complexities upon the apparently mundane. Such studies are exemplified 
by researching processes such as the making and unmaking of time (Grabham, 2016, 
Valverde, 2014, Blomley, 2003, 2014) or knowledge (Pottage, 2014).
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From materiality to the fluidity of law
A key implication of materiality-inflected approaches is the idea that the ‘social’ is 
inherently fluid and indeterminate – an idea that is both particularly challenging, and 
particularly interesting, for thinking about law. Here, the fragility of boundaries and 
categories, the complexity of processes of ordering, and the entanglement of knowl-
edge, practices, and materiality invite us to rethink the ways in which law should be 
understood and approached (Cloatre and Pickersgill, 2014). The co-constitution of 
materiality and practices replaces broader understandings of what we can take as fixed 
starting points of ‘social’ analysis. One of the immediate implications for studies of 
law is the impossibility of the classic distinction between law and society (or, in fact, 
‘law and’ anything); indeed, such a distinction implied by the conjunction collapses 
entirely. In his introduction to ANT (2005: 7), Latour regards The Common Place of 
Law as the kind of study in which the social question is collapsed by the method.
We suggest that the idea of fluidity has two key implications for materiality- 
inflected legal scholarship: first, at the conceptual level, these approaches suggest a 
radical dissolution of the stability of law as a defined social field, whose existence is at 
any point a given and independent source of norms, seeing in its place a field always 
in making and deeply entangled in other forms of social making and unmaking or 
unsettlement. The methodological implications of this insight suggest that a return of 
ethnographic attention to the day-to-day practices of law and legalities, as well as its 
localised making, unmaking, settling and challenging, would be more productive than 
turning legalities in on themselves. A key implication is that the boundaries between 
the legal and illegal, regulated and unregulated, law and paper and law in action, or 
indeed of the ‘legal’ per se, start dissolving once legal processes become analysed in 
terms of their material making and entanglements. Fleur Johns (2013: 24) has begun 
this kind of analysis in thinking about how non-legality is made up, in this case inter-
national law, challenging those
international legal studies that seek to apply international law to a world cast in 
some sense as beyond that law (or vice versa), worry incessantly that interna-
tional law is not enough for the task of application (or absorption), and hence 
neglect to scrutinize and tactically engage with those aspects of international 
legal work that are constitutive of at least some dimensions of that beyond.
Legal processes can be seen as relational and constantly in the making, as practices 
transform the very objects they seek to engage – from minute artefacts to subjec-
tive understandings of law. Through their emphasis on the fluidity of objects and 
on the relationality of the social, materiality-inflected approaches to law therefore 
open useful perspectives in interrogating how law is deployed, in apprehending its 
complex effects and exploring its modes of action. It also raises questions about the 
very nature of law – and of where the boundaries between legal/non-legal may be 
drawn. In order to understand these mechanisms and the ontological significance of a 
move towards materiality, we argue that it is necessary to move beyond the terrain of 
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legal institutions and into the messy spaces of the everyday where these legalities and 
non-legalities take hold (see, for example, Mezey, 2001). This in turn raises questions 
about the specificities of both the object of study and the discipline – what is left of 
the law, and how do we talk about it? As Latour suggested about the weakness of the 
notion of ‘society’, is there any sense in which the law is specific or peculiar – or is it 
always simply ad hoc and fragile? Some of these conversations relate closely to those 
questions opened up by legal anthropologies, to which we now turn.
Legal anthropologies, from law to legalities
Following the emphasis of materiality-inflected approaches to law requires a particu-
lar type of attention to laws’ everyday. In many ways, exploring the law outside of its 
classic, or official, spaces offers a richer picture of its nuanced contours than focusing 
exclusively on those explicitly ‘legal’ sites. Here, our argument meets the extensive 
work that anthropologies of law have produced over the years to move beyond the 
most clear-cut instances of legal events. In tune with those anthropological studies 
of law, we argue that, if one wants to appreciate law’s ways of acting and its making 
though social practice/s, one needs to explore law outside its own explicit spaces. 
This makes our focus different to some extent from those of Latour and others 
(Latour, 2013; Pottage, 2014), whose attention to materiality has been framed as an 
exploration of its modes of enunciation. Instead, we want to reflect on the broader 
questions that legal anthropologists have been asking about law’s nature, practices, 
boundaries – or, to remain within an ANT vocabulary, ‘modes of action’. We also 
remain convinced that empirical engagement and reflection outside the apparently 
official contexts of law provides a significant set of opportunities for theorization. In 
these spaces, law’s modes of existence are less certain, as the boundaries of ‘law’ itself 
are blurred. Instead, and bringing together early ANT and the work of legal anthro-
pologists, we emphasise the importance of micro-events, and materially situated prac-
tices, to theorisation. Indeed, one of the most significant contributions of ANT and 
other materiality-inflected approaches for legal studies is their ability to poke at the 
boundaries of law, from its fractal side, and engage with some of its more silent and 
discreet modes of action.
This broader appreciation of law is most clearly addressed in Ewick and Silbey’s 
classic, The Common Place of Law (1998). They critique the ‘law first’ tradition of 
scholarship, arguing that it has drastically narrowed our vision; and that, despite the 
research which shows that law “has no center and little uniformity, it is often implic-
itly assumed that the law is still recognizably, and usefully distinguishable from that 
which is not law”. If we unhinge law from its institutional setting and think about 
the cadences of legalities in everyday life, “we must tolerate a kind of conceptual 
murkiness”. The key move for our purposes here is away from ‘law’ to legality, a term 
that Ewick and Silbey use “to refer to the meanings, sources of authority, and cultural 
practices that are commonly recognized as legal, regardless of who employs them or 
for what ends”. They provide a material example of this shift – an old chair left on a 
public street, where snow has been cleared, to hold a parking spot might be seen in 
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a Lockian sense as a marker of exclusivity, ownership/possession as a result of labour. 
Silbey and Cavicchi (2005: 561) see this chair as “a visual image of the law from the 
bottom up and from outside of legal institutions”. It signals a type of ownership and 
“often elicits the same sorts of deference and respect accorded more conventional 
types of property: Other drivers park elsewhere”.
This move away from the ‘explicit sites’ of legal events, and from law to legali-
ties, mirrors that of STS when looking at science from the laboratory to its outside, 
and from science in the making to the deployment of constituted scientific objects 
and artefacts. In law, it suggests a move away from a primary focus on the modes of 
enunciation of the law (though these are relevant) and toward the more fluid spaces 
of legal meanings, expression and ambivalence. Indeed, a meeting point between 
materiality-inflected approaches and the longer tradition of legal anthropology lies in 
their mutual challenge to the boundaries of classic sociological analysis. Materiality 
approaches have from the outset differentiated themselves from approaches focusing 
on contextualization – for actor-network theorists, there is no ‘context’, only inter-
relationships. As Lezaun and Woolgar (2013) put it: “ ‘materiality’, just as ‘context’ and 
its cognate terms, needs to be understood as the contingent upshot of practices, rather 
than a bedrock reality to be illuminated by an ontological investigation” (p. 326). 
Such an approach meets arguments long-made in legal anthropology, in which the 
relationship between ‘law’ and ‘society’ has been revisited as a more dynamic and 
co-constitutive set of processes; in which law is more than a static object expected 
to impact upon, or originate from, a pre-existing society (Morrill and Mayo, 2015). 
Arguably, materiality-inflected approaches may be taking this notion of fluidity as 
opposed to fixity to its furthest by seeking to apply it to each of the objects of law, 
but it also primarily proposes an intervention into ‘law and society’ debates that seeks 
to deny the set existence of either. This is what Rose and Valverde (1998: 545) might 
have had in mind when they argued that there is no such thing as ‘the law’. They 
argued (ibid.) that
Law, as a unified phenomenon governed by certain principles, is a fiction. This 
fiction is the creation of the legal discipline, of legal textbooks, of jurisprudence 
itself, which is forever seeking for the differentia specifica that will unify and 
rationalize the empirical diversity of legal sites, legal concepts, legal criteria of 
judgement, legal personnel, legal discourses, legal objects and objectives.
Materiality-inflected approaches also arguably challenge the imagined boundaries 
between law and its ‘others’, or the inside and outside of law, meeting in this effort 
the proponents of legal consciousness traditions. Ewick and Silbey (1998), in their 
engagement with law in the everyday consciousness of working-class Americans, 
provided fresh insights into what law may be or claim to be. At the core of their 
argument is the idea that legalities are transformed, or enacted, in and through the 
meaning-making processes of those who experience them. In their study, legalities are 
multiple, and arguably a determinedly ‘different’ object for each of those that come to 
experience them, and in turn rewrite them in their own way as a social actor. They 
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compare the reception of legalities to whale-song, an analogy which has resonance 
with the kind of ontological choreography through which ANT scholarship twists. 
Like Anne-Marie Mol’s sick bodies, legalities are multiple in their everyday ontology. 
The field of legal consciousness has grown exponentially, focusing at times on the 
complex consciousness of legal actors, such as disputants and non-disputants as well 
as those who are outside the system (e.g., Cowan, 2004). The core questions these 
studies raise are about the fluidity of legalities as they are experienced in everyday 
life as well as echoing the fluidity of the social. While some have felt uneasy about 
the apparent dissolution of a core idea of ‘law’ in legal consciousness (Mezey, 2001; 
Levine and Mellema, 2001), especially when focusing on the experiences of those 
only occasionally encountering its institutions, they demonstrate that, in its modes of 
action, legality may not retain any more solidity than any other social objects; and it is 
likely to be similarly open to some degree of rewriting and reinventing in the every-
day – within, like any objects, the possibilities that networked forces allow. For us, the 
key significance of these studies is their disembedding from the initial ‘making’ of law, 
as it is produced by legislators or in courtrooms. It is not about seizing an unseizable 
‘original moment’, but about reimagining the law as a process of ongoing production.
Of course, the fluidities inherent in legalities do not, as for any other social object, 
entail their full malleability; they do not necessarily imply a loss of a core, made up of 
things, languages, codes, institutions, practices, which although constantly changing, 
reinvented and stretched in new directions, remain recognizable for particular actors 
at particular times. For Naomi Mezey (2001: 150),
Although it generally appears in its reified form as a seemingly external object, at 
heart the law is the accumulation of the tiny and intimate acts of people as they 
go about their business and try to make sense of the world; in other words, law 
is the embodiment of social practices.
Susan Silbey (2005) also reminds us that the reinventing of legalities that everyday 
encounters generate always operates within limits – themselves the result of a myriad 
of other social patterns: ‘Indeterminacy does not make all things possible; it means 
only that possibilities are not predetermined or fixed’ (ibid.: 330).
It is what ‘counts’ as law that offers one of the most difficult conceptual dilemmas 
for both legal consciousness scholars and a materiality-inflected revisiting of the law. 
In the way ANT authors have emphasised the irreducibility of the social, and the fact 
that notions such as ‘the economy’ can only be explained through an unpacking of 
the practices, objects and relations on which they are based (Callon, 2007), the ‘legal’ 
may cease to be a useful descriptive category of a generally understood, and shared, 
concept. Critiques of legal consciousness point to the dissolution of any essence to 
‘law’, which some may want to continue pursuing for political and analytical pur-
poses. Indeed, the contributions of legal consciousness go beyond demonstrating the 
effects law may have on an outside world, but seek to revisit the boundaries of legali-
ties. One response to this is to suggest that the boundaries lie in the perceptions, atti-
tudes and approaches not of the researched but the researcher in their interpretation 
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of their data. It is perfectly possible to observe that at least some of the stories of their 
research participants are read by Ewick and Silbey as providing meanings about legal-
ities, when others might not have done so. Naomi Mezey (2001: 153), in her critique 
of The Common Place of Law, illustrates why a move away from the fixity of law also 
needs to be complemented by an attempt at defining multiple relationalities:
By looking for the exercise of power in the mundane extremities of everyday 
life, by locating legality wherever vaguely legal concepts are embedded in social 
practices, Ewick and Silbey radically reconceptualize what the law is. Losing law 
in society is partly their point (p. 35). But it also means losing any meaningful dis-
tinction between Rita Michaels’s experience in divorce court (p. 60) and Charles 
Reed’s protest to the school board about a teacher’s transfer (pp. 115–16), or 
between being arrested and contesting the water bill. To the extent that they have 
authoritative power in people’s daily lives, all the institutions, rules, and conven-
tions that people defer to or defy are equally part of legality.
That is not to suggest that Ewick and Silbey’s readings are not valid; far from it; but it 
does suggest that the ways in which researchers see legalities reflect their perceptions 
and biases (just as any researcher). Here, as Haraway would suggest, and as we return 
to below, we are all tied by our own bodily vision. Reflecting on The Common Place 
of Law, Susan Silbey (2005: 347) re-emphasised that legal consciousness is centrally 
concerned with the production of legality, rather than its effects as a predetermined 
(and self-referential) object:
In this work, legal consciousness is decentered in that the research does not doc-
ument chiefly what people think and do about the law but rather how what they 
think and do coalesces into a recognizable, durable phenomena and institution 
we recognize as the law.
Effacing the boundaries of the ‘legal’
In reimagining the law as a fluid set of relationships, studies beyond legal ethnogra-
phies have offered ways to revisit law’s uncertain boundaries in the everyday. They use 
other starting points to imagine the ambivalence of relationships with, and around, 
fluid legalities. Anthropological explorations of ‘illegalities’, and in particular illegal 
markets, offer a useful starting point here on how to navigate on the borders of the 
legal, without necessarily using it as a fixed, or even relevant, categorisation. In her 
inquiry into the counterfeit drug markets of Nigeria, Kristin Peterson (2014) uses the 
concept of ‘speculative markets’ to explore the spaces of informal medicines distri-
bution. This enables her to move beyond more classic legal/illegal dichotomies often 
used when thinking about such drug markets. Perhaps precisely because her central 
interest is not the law, she subtly moves beyond notions of criminality, and illegality, 
to reflect on needs, powers and practices in strategies of survival. She demonstrates in 
nuanced ways the different processes through which the legitimacy and the necessity 
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of those markets is created not just against but also with and through formal state law. 
Similarly, Janet Roitman (2006), in her exploration of illegality in the Chad Basin, 
provides another useful example of why it is necessary to move beyond the illusion 
of a traceable dichotomy between what is about (or indeed, against) or not about 
the law. In exploring the narratives of the bandits’ activities, she renders visible the 
deployment of other systems of normativity that evolve alongside law (legal plural-
ism) but also navigate across, in and out of it, so as to render the notion of illegality 
itself redundant/irrelevant. Focusing on some of these ideas, she explains:
More than just an instrumentalist calculation, or a strategy to maximize eco-
nomic gains or personal interests, they explain this exercise in maintaining ille-
gality in terms of licit behavior, or what they see as practices that, while not 
lawful (hence illegal), are nonetheless not forbidden. Illegal activities are rendered 
licit practice. Licit practice is in this sense understood to be what is allowed or 
what has become normal practice. This particular domain of illegality – that is, 
unregulated economic activities and gang-based highway robbery – thus creates 
a supplementary sense of “licit.” For many people in the Chad Basin, “licit” is 
not simply equated with what is taken to be legal or lawful; “licit” has come to 
signify practices that are permissible or, to use the terms of my interlocutors, even 
“legitimate,” given the context in which they live.
(p. 249)
Notions of licit and illicit, legitimate and illegitimate, come to complicate what pro-
cesses of ‘illegality’ are about, to a point where law ceases to appear as a central deter-
minant in what shapes the normative landscape. As formally illegal economic activities 
become normalised, they come to coexist with other forms of economies in a way 
that make differentiations between apparently distinct spaces of social activities more 
complicated. Here, Roitman’s analysis complicates illegalities in a way that echoes 
Ewick and Silbey’s efforts to complicate the notion of legalities (p. 251): ‘Despite the 
contradiction in terms, the illegal realm is a domain of licit behavior; the practice of 
illegality is an ethics insofar as it is a practice of truth.’
Cloatre and Enright (2016) also move beyond divisions between legal/illegal/
non-legal in their study of the history of the contraceptive movement in Ireland. 
Relying on everyday narratives of those who were engaged in resisting, avoiding and 
reimagining the Irish prohibition on the sale of condoms for over 30 years, they argue 
for the inadequacy of imagining a clear boundary between the law and that which 
breaks it, or is not about it. Of course, the law has particular features and constructs 
particular patterns of powers: being formally within it offers a different form of secu-
rity than being outside it does. There is a particular precarity to spaces of formal ille-
gality. At the same time, drawing clear boundaries around the law is neither possible 
nor desirable for social analysis. Instead, and relying on the work of Povinelli (2011), 
they propose to revisit the engagement of those they study as being about alterna-
tive social visions, that are not graspable through the drawing of an imaginary legal/
illegal boundary. Formal states of il/legality continue to matter in some ways but are 
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largely constituted through the subjective beliefs and the everyday practices of those 
who ignore it, challenge it and in turn redefine its modalities of being (Halliday and 
Morgan, 2013). They are never just a pre-existing state of events.
Of course, the fluidity of the law also has different forms. Even if focusing on legal 
institutions themselves, those are always permeated by other forms of normativity and 
social relations. Here, our understanding of the fluidity of law differs from Latour’s 
exposé of the Conseil d’Etat, and our view of legal relations as being of a ‘different 
nature’ from others is maybe not fully aligned. At one level of course, what is pro-
duced within legal institutions emerges and is self-defined as legal – legal institutions 
produce a particular kind of legality. But analytically, the relationships produced (and 
producing) are inherently part of a broader landscape of connections, and emerge not 
as unique or particular. Again, this is helped by shifting to maybe less familiar terrains 
than those that have for long predominated legal scholarship. For example, when 
Peterson follows her informal medicines in a local courtroom in Nigeria, the eva-
siveness of law, and its inherent hybridity, comes to the fore: legal texts, materials and 
settings come to produce a particular kind of encounter, but are also entangled with 
customary expectations, practices and spatialities. Rather than two separate discourses, 
however, the modes of enunciation of each, as well as their material ramifications, 
make them impossible to isolate. In the end, the decision of the court is not the one 
that those who were relying on written laws were expecting, as the legal judgment 
becomes transformed by the multiple social processes that shape how the spaces in 
question are understood in the courtroom.
Cloatre (2018) argues that looking at the boundaries of legitimate medicine pro-
vides a vantage point from which to seize the porous and hybrid nature of law and 
its boundaries: what falls in and out of medicine or constitutes a legitimate type of 
healing practice is determined not only by abstractly defined cultural and historical 
elements, but by grounded and always shifting material embodiments of those his-
tories and cultures and by everyday practices. Medicines are complex sites of legal 
events. When approaching the boundaries of medicine (away from biomedicine and 
towards popular or traditional healing, away from tablets and towards herbs, away from 
the institutions and towards the spaces of informality), endless opportunities arise 
to see the boundaries of law as a social object crumble (see also Fisiy, 1998). Others 
have explored the always-renegotiated nature of the law and its others by looking 
at the interactions between witchcraft and formal legal systems, where endless shifts 
between them are such that the boundaries of each order become unclear (Niehaus, 
2005).
But if legal events are inherently hybrid, spaces that are apparently ‘unregulated’ 
may also be permeated by subtle forms of legality and themselves appear as particular 
forms of socio-legal hybrids. For example, Cloatre’s (2013) analysis of pharmaceuti-
cal patents shows the unexpected ways in which those supposedly ‘legal’ tools con-
tinue to act in Djibouti, where they have no formal existence, or how the labelling 
of certain drugs as ‘counterfeit’ escapes the legal boundaries of the term. Similarly, 
Harper and Ecks (2013), in following the formally unregulated drug market of Nepal, 
demonstrate how law-like mechanisms fall into place to recreate networks of power 
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and influence in drug distribution. Throughout these studies, medicines as objects 
come to challenge the presumption of where law sits, how it acts, or indeed what 
type of social space it occupies. Drugs shift between categories that law is formally 
expected to define, through the practices of their many users. Meanwhile, ‘unreg-
ulated’ markets become shaped by myriad legal influences that are often indirect 
and bear limited relation to what the law may have intended, but demonstrate its 
(influential) messiness. At stake in those studies are questions about where and how 
law matters, and what can be drawn from its formal existence or absence. At one 
level, these are questions about fluidity within the law: how norms travel across juris-
dictions, in and out of materials, through unexpected networks, effects and spaces. 
At the same time, they also invite us to reflect more carefully on the possibility of 
a boundary between the legal and ‘the rest’, and on the uniqueness of law. Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2014) suggests we pay attention to the discreet ways 
in which the lawscape operates and to the unexpected ways in which silent legali-
ties affect our everyday. Drawing the lawscape is about acknowledging and retracing 
fractal legalities. Similarly, acknowledging the fluidity of law is about exploring the 
boundary-making efforts that go into generating both the formal and visible spaces 
of legality and the discreet, unexpected and everyday inscriptions of legalities as one 
set of events in the shaping of complex b/orders.
As an example of these kinds of silent but fractal legalities, Cowan et al. (2018) 
focus on discourses of property ownership produced by marginal home owners. Legal 
scholars focus predominantly on two opposing theoretical positions – exclusion and 
an ideal of progressive property, in which certain legal institutional values provide for 
a stewardship role of the owner – in which they share a singular rather curious feature: 
both theses about property have a top-down, law-first orientation. In seeking to state 
what property is and why it is what it is, as well as what it should be, their starting 
points are law and rights to, as well as over, property. Of course, their orientations 
are rather different; the ownership thesis types tend to rest with hard-nosed law and 
economics thinking; the progressives assign legal values to which conflicts over rights 
to property should aspire. There is also the related concern among property theorists 
about the sorting processes inherent in property which are said to produce insiders 
and outsiders. This work, which seeks to uncover the often hidden politics of legal 
doctrine by reference to legal values, fits within a set of understandings about legal 
doctrine which highlight both their power and their problematic. As Fox O’Ma-
hony (2014: 411) puts it, “A view from the marginalised outsider provides a valuable 
mechanism by which to test whether the frames we use to resolve property problems 
orient us towards immanent solutions that tend to privilege insiders over outsiders 
(or vice versa)”.
However, as Blomley (2013, 2016) has demonstrated, the exclusionist and pro-
gressive theses are problematic in their untested empirical assertions. Reading Cowan 
et al.’s data demonstrates the porousness and fluidity in everyday understandings of 
ownership among their marginal owners. These are people at the insider/outsider 
margins, but they firmly express themselves as private owners and assert their superi-
ority over the social rump. They understand property as a form of control, something 
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which was emphasised by their décor and stuff (a position which chimes with the 
anthropologists of home: Miller, 2010; Hurdley, 2006). They express themselves as 
being in control but the stories they tell are of being out of control. Their boundaries 
are not the front door but expressed through their positionality – that is, property for 
them is what distinguishes them from the rest and is emphasised through things, like 
potted plants, sweet wrappers or concerns over the dropping of cigarette butts. In this 
rendering, property ownership performs understandings of tenure and class.
Those stories are interpreted as contradictory and almost incapable of a mono-
chrome analysis. However, they argue that something rather more significant is going 
on in these narratives. Miller (2010: 96) plays with the word accommodating, arguing 
that home is not just a place to live but an ongoing process in which we appropriate 
where we live: “It may imply our changing of a home to suit ourselves, but it can also 
imply the need to change ourselves in order to suit our accommodation”. And we are 
constantly engaging with this process, changing things as we go. Cowan et al. suggest 
that they must embrace their participants’ contradictory narratives precisely because 
their participants were changing themselves, as they sought to establish their place in 
the world both at the level of idea and relationally. They argue that this was what the 
narratives were telling them, emphasising the complexity and richness of property’s 
everyday lives.
At the same time, acknowledging the non-uniqueness of law places legal scholars 
in a dilemma: on the one hand, the importance of a critical agenda that continues to 
explore the dissolution of legalities in the everyday, the uncertainty of its boundaries 
and the inherent subjectivity of its definition; on the other hand, the underlying ques-
tion of what law, as an object of analysis and set of social relations, may be, and if and 
how we can analyse it as a defined thing. This latter question is not one this chapter 
can answer – or indeed any single analysis could. Instead, it may be useful to reflect 
on the strategies we may deploy to pursue both these agendas, taking seriously their 
challenges and continuing to develop understandings of law as an object, or a series of 
objects, that is multiple, ambiguous, elusive and constantly reshaped both by its own 
actions and those of its analysts.
 Approaching everyday legalities: some methodological 
implications
Some of these questions, and in particular that of a return to a clearer sense of the 
legal, have been explored by others. Attending to the modes of enunciation of law, as 
proposed by Latour and others, is indeed one way to address the question of what law 
is from a fresh perspective by reflecting on its material mode of existence. However, 
as we have expressed above, this strand of inquiry has not sufficiently engaged yet 
with the rich contributions of legal anthropologies that have challenged the bound-
aries of an imagined, defined, legal space, to make a fully satisfactory intervention 
on these questions. Even if remaining focused on the question of the making of law 
and its enunciations, examples such as the court ruling Kristin Peterson describes 
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demonstrate how the process of creating a legal decision may borrow from a multi-
plicity of languages and practices, that others may not recognise as law in a univer-
salised way.
Annelise Riles (2005) proposes another useful entry point into rethinking about 
what is specific or special about law, as she puts forward a new agenda for re-engaging 
legal technicalities. The agenda is important and indeed a useful counterpoint to 
studies focused on the dissolution of law rather than its own production or language. 
At the same time, it encounters limits, once again, when moving away from the spaces 
where law is technical to where it is engaged by its everyday users (e.g., Sally Engle 
Merry, 1990), to the travels of medicines, to the travels of the lease. The everyday 
experiences of legalities, as much as they are a challenge to its definition and labelling, 
play a part in rendering it powerful. As Susan Silbey reminds us, “The law is a durable 
and powerful human invention because a good part of legality is just this invisible 
constraint, suffusing and saturating our everyday life” (2005: 331).
Our premise, as we have explained, is that one of the key ways in which 
materiality-inflected theories are useful for legal researchers is precisely to focus on 
these other spaces – those where law is experienced, practice, translated, reappropriated 
and in turn redefined by its many users. Those spaces where what Callon describes as 
the ‘actor-worlds’ of law-makers (the imagined spaces where law would be practiced) 
are rewritten by the messiness of real-life society. Such explorations, inevitably, depend 
on detailed empirical descriptions of those spaces, that are also informed sufficiently 
by critical and conceptual tools to open up broader challenges to preconceived ideas 
of law. In turn, an effect of this is to render visible the more discrete existences of law, 
that it would be easy for legal analysts to forget or push aside as irrelevant.
For this purpose, we advocate the kinds of theorising about legalities which enable 
a reflection on the mundane, the everyday, through multiple sources of data that 
enable the discreet modes of operation of law to become visible. The simple act of 
box-ticking (and the production of the box categories themselves) involves a variety 
of translations of the self. Indeed, in one study, the box-ticking exercise was regarded 
as a method of performing risk, trust and implementation (Cowan et al., 2009: 297).
The key contributions of legal ethnographies are indeed arguably about both 
the fluidity and the multiplicities of law (Bibler Coutin and Fortin, 2015). In the 
way that anthropology has reflected on the relation between ethnography and the-
ory (Biehl and McKay, 2012, Fassin, 2013), one of the contributions of materiality- 
inflected approaches to law may be to encourage us to reflect on what the messiness 
of the everyday of law, in its materially embedded practices, may contribute to a 
broader theorization of law as an object – and indeed suggest some limits to over- 
generalisations. As those traditions open doors for the critical interrogation of law and 
its limits, they suggest that legalities may continue to be defined as a fluid set of rela-
tionships, rather than as a neatly contained social category. By allowing the fluidity of 
the social to be brought to the front and categorisations to be opened up, one of the 
great strengths of these approaches may therefore be to enable a new interrogation of 
law by avoiding its assumptions and pre-defined characteristics.
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There are many reasons that make such recognition of the inherent messiness of 
law aside of its formal modes of enunciation, or expected modes of action, as both 
practically and theoretically important. One of them, however, is the ongoing need 
to improve the ranges of voices and experiences that are included in defining what 
law is and how it works. A focus on formal law and its institutions can only succeed 
in reflecting the privilege of the status of law and its actors. It tells us nothing about 
those affected by its eminence (the pigeons and the farmer in Latour’s opening story). 
Indeed, the modes of enunciation of the law as explored in the Conseil d’Etat should 
be confronted with, compared to and weighed against the ways in which decisions are 
made, for example, in the Nigerian courtroom just as much as in the everyday deci-
sions of Rita Michaels. What happens in each of the offices and each of the markets 
of Djibouti, Ghana, Nigeria or the borders of the Chad basin, or in homes around 
the world, are in themselves inevitably productive of new, diverse, productive and 
restrictive legalities. We argue that these legalities of the everyday are not just crucial 
to the ways in which law works, but also attendant to the silences and hegemonic 
truths produced by legality. These are the productive spaces where legal anthropology 
and STS can meet, and where materiality-inflected approaches can help us reinvent 
how we approach legality/law and its boundaries. Although Latour has been recently 
critical of his own concept of irreduction, the notion may remain helpful in ques-
tioning law and approaching it without preconceived notions of its working or of the 
imagined movements that shape its action.
This goes some way in acknowledging the inevitable situatedness of our knowl-
edge as researchers. Engaging this issue and navigating through the imagined dichot-
omy between the universalistic claims of science and pure relativism, Haraway 
reminds us that
the alternative to relativism is not totalization and single vision, which is always 
finally the unmarked category whose power depends on systematic narrowing 
and obscuring. The alternative to relativism is partial, locatable, critical knowl-
edges sustaining the possibilities of webs of connections called solidarity in pol-
itics and shared conversations in epistemology.
(2007: 117)
At the same time, both Haraway and Karen Barad (2007) argue that the process of 
observation is never just that, and never simply about capturing a pre-existing state 
of being: the process of observation itself contributes to producing and transforming 
objects as they are being mobilised, complicating yet further the process of empirical 
inquiry and the very nature of the task.
While no simple solution to the dilemma of engaging law in its defined yet chang-
ing multiplicity can be proposed, these are a few ways in which materiality-inflected 
theories may be useful. By recognising and embracing this shifting and uncertain 
nature of legalities as relational, and as part of a broader and messier set of connec-
tions, materiality-inflected approaches suggest that it is important to pay attention to 
micro-moments as well as to big events and to the apparently insignificant rather than 
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to the obvious. They also enable us to never take ‘the law’ or its feature for granted, 
but to always seek to unpack its particular ways of working, within a particular set of 
processes or a particular space. Finally it invites us to reflect critically on the nature 
of ethnographic knowledge: as a necessary entry point to gather and recount some of 
those complex and localised features, but as an endeavour that needs to remain critical 
and modest in its own claims. Ethnographic knowledge is always constitutive of the 
very order it aims to describe, and always inevitably situated and partial. In our collec-
tive efforts to conceptualise and reflect on the law, it nevertheless remains a necessary 
element of understanding better the contours of fluid legalities.
Conclusions
What is left of law, and is there anything that remains characteristic of, or central to, 
law?
Once we start acknowledging the unexpected effects of law, account for the 
hybridity of legal discourses, myths and interpretations, is it more than whatever it 
becomes in materially-embedded practices – and therefore something that we can 
only understand by observing these practices?
The movement away from the formalistic starting point of law, and its imaginary 
as something that impacts society as a separate system, started long ago in socio-legal 
studies and critical legal studies, and indeed materiality-inflected theories offer tools 
and questions to push this even further. Legalities can then be understood as being 
constituted through routines and practices, so that they are little more than what 
actants make of it, or with it, and little more than what the materials it affects and 
shapes go on to do. Its origins, including institutional origins or textual forms, may 
matter in identifying its starting point, but, for us, that offers only a very limited snap-
shot of its vivacity and truth-claims. And indeed, these forms may not make its modes 
of actions radically different from other forms of ordering, at least in their practice. 
Law as the expression of state power remains, of course, an important dimension to 
acknowledge, but once mixed with fluid jurisdictional boundaries, private interests, 
routinised practices that may or may not follow what the state expected or imagined 
when laws were drafted, and material travels, this vision of law as an institutionalised 
exercise of state power becomes limited.
Instead, rendering visible some of this messiness allows for a broader rethink of 
the meaning of law, its practical deployments, and therefore enables more encom-
passing critiques of power through its silent as well as overt expressions. In our work 
on houses and medicines, we can see the potential that this kind of messiness has for 
legal method and for our appreciation of the everyday heterogeneous practices of 
legality. However, with Blomley (2014), we think that there is considerable potential 
in unwrapping the ways in which legality is sold to us as apparently homogeneous 
when that is not our experience; and, in so doing, there is scope for radically re- 
orienting our approaches and methods for appreciating difference and the signifi-
cance of the mundane, the blackboxed. So, for example, as the courts in England and 
Wales move towards digitisation, while their fabric disintegrates, and as the spaces of 
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legality become fractured and spliced with the everyday (or are recognised as such), a 
focus on materialities opens up new sites for the engagement of socio-legal scholar-
ship enmeshed with our lived experiences as autoethnographies.
Note
 1 We use this expression in this chapter to denote the kinds of methodologies in which matter 
extends beyond human matter, and which emphasise the processes, practices, discursive tra-
jectories and translations of things across time and space.
Bibliography
Barad, Karen, Meeting the Universe Halfway, Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
Bennett Jane, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.
Bibler Coutin, Susan and Veronique Fortin, ‘Legal Ethnographies and Ethnographic Law’, in 
Handbook of Law and Society, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015.
Biehl, João, Vita, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013.
Biehl, João and Ramah McKay, ‘Ethnography as Political Critique’, Anthropological Quarterly, 85, 
1209–1227, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2012.0057.
BBlomley, Nicholas, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property, London: Rout-
ledge, 2003.
Blomley, Nicholas, ‘Performing property: Making the world’, Canadian Journal of Law and Juris-
prudence, 26, 23–48, 2013.
Blomley, Nicholas, ‘Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing’, Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science, 10, 133–148, 2014.
Blomley, Nicholas, ‘The boundaries of property: Complexity, relationality, and spatiality’, Law 
and Society Review, 50, 224–55, 2016.
Callon, Michel, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops 
and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay’, The Sociological Review, 32, 196–233, 1984.
Callon, Michel, ‘What Does It Mean to Say That Economics Is Performative?’, in D. MacK-
enzie, F. Muniesa and L. Siu (eds), Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of 
Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 311–357, 2007.
Cloatre, Emilie, Pills for the Poorest: An Exploration of TRIPS and Access to Medication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Cloatre, Emilie and Martyn Pickersgill, ‘Introduction’, in Knowledge, Technology and Law, Lon-
don: Routledge, 2014.
Cloatre, Emilie, ‘Traditional Medicines, Law, and the (Dis)Ordering of Temporalities’, in 
S. Beynon-Jones, and E. Grabham (eds), Regulating Time, London: Routledge, 2018.
Conaghan, Joanne, ‘Feminism, law and materialism: Reclaiming the “tainted” realm’, in M. Davies 
and V. Munro (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2016.
Cowan, Dave, ‘Legal consciousness: Some observations’, Modern Law Review, 67, 928-58, 2004.
Cowan, Dave, Carr, Helen and Wallace, Alison, Ownership, Narrative, Things, London: Palgrave, 
2018.
Cowan, Dave, Morgan, Karen and McDermont, Morag, ‘Nominations: An actor-network 
approach’, Housing Studies, 24, 281-300, 2009
Engle Merry, Sally, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working-Class 
Americans, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990.
Enright, Mairead and Cloatre, Emilie ‘Commentary on MgGee v. AG’, in Aoife O’Donoghue, 
Mairead Enright and Julie McCandless, Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges Troubles and the Gen-
dered Politics of Identity, Oxford: Hart, 2016.
Legalities and materialities
451
Fassin, Didier, When Bodies Remember, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
Fassin, Didier, ‘A Case for Critical Ethnography’, Social Science & Medicine, 99, 119–126, 2013.
Fisiy, Cyprian F., ‘Containing Occult Practices: Witchcraft Trials in Cameroon’, African Studies 
Review, 41, 143–163, 1998. https://doi.org/10.2307/525357.
Fox O’Mahony, Lorna, ‘Property outsiders and the hidden politics of doctrinalism’, Current 
Legal Problems, 67, 409-445, 2014.
Freeman, Richard and Maybin, Jo, ‘Documents, Practices and Policy’, Evidence and Policy, 7(2), 
155–170, 2011.
Grabham, Emily, Brewing Legal Times: Things, Form and the Enactment of Law, Toronto University 
Press, 2016.
Halliday, Simon and Morgan, Bronwen, ‘I Fought the Law and the Law Won? Legal Conscious-
ness and the Critical Imagination’, Current Legal Problems, 66, 1-33, 2013.
Haraway, Donna, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, London: Routledge, 
1991.
Haraway, Donna, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege 
of a Partial Perspective’ in K. Asdal, B. Brita and I. Moser (eds), Technoscience: The Politics of 
Intervention, Oslo: Oslo Academic Press, 109–134, 2007.
Harper, Ian and Stefan, Ecks, ‘ “There Is No Regulation, Actually” : The Private Market for 
Anti-TB Drugs in India’, in Joao Biehl and Petryna, When People Come First : Anthropology 
and Social Innovation in Global Health, Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.
Hull, Matthew, Government of Paper, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
Hunter, Caroline, ‘Solar Panels, Home Owners and Leases: The Lease as a Socio-Legal Object’, 
in Dave Cowan and Dave Wincott (eds), Exploring the Legal in Socio-Legal Studies, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Hurdley, Rachel, ‘Dismantling mantelpieces: Narrating identities and materializing culture in 
the home’, Sociology, 40, 717-33, 2006.
Jacob, Marie Andrée and Riles, Annelise, ‘The New Bureaucracies of Virtue: Introduction’, 
PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 30, 181–191, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1525/
pol.2007.30.2.181.
Johns, Fleur, Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law, Oxford: OUP, 2013
Johnson, Jim, ‘Mixing humans and nonhumans together: The sociology of a door-closer’, Social 
Problems, 35, 298-310, 2008.
Langwick, Stacey, Bodies, Politics and African Healing, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
Latour, Bruno, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford: OUP, 
2005.
Latour, Bruno, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat, Cambridge: Polity, 2009.
Latour, Bruno, An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
Latour, Bruno and Woolgar, Steve, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979.
Law, John and Mol, Annemarie, ‘Notes on Materiality and Sociality’, The Sociological Review, 
143, 274–294, 1995.
Levine, Kay and Mellema, James, ‘Strategizing the street: How law matters in the lives of women 
in the street-level drug economy’, Law and Social Inquiry, 26, 169-207, 2001.
Mezey, Naomi, ‘Out of the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and the Commonplace’, Law & 
Social Inquiry, 26, 145–167, 2001.
Miller, Daniel, Stuff, Cambridge: Polity, 2010.
Mol, Anne-Marie, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003.
Morrill, Calvin and Kelsey, Mayo, ‘Charting the “Classics” in Law and Society: The Develop-
ment of the Field Over the Past Half] Century’, in Handbook of Law and Society, Hoboken, 
NJ: Wiley, 2015.
Emilie Cloatre and Dave Cowan
452
Mulcahy, Linda, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law, London: Routledge, 
2010.
Niehaus, Isak A, ‘Beyond Rationalism: Rethinking Magic, Witchcraft and Sorcery (review)’, 
African Studies Review, 48, 164–165, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.2005.0031.
Peterson, Kristin, Speculative Markets: Drug Circuits and Derivative Life in Nigeria, Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014.
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas, Spatial Justice: Body, Lawscape, Atmosphere, London: 
Routledge, 2014.
Pottage, Alain, ‘Law After Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law’, Theory, Cul-
ture & Society, 31, 147–166, 2014a.
Pottage, Alain, ‘Paper Prototypes’, in Emilie Cloatre and Martyn Pickersgill (eds), Knowledge, 
Technology and Law, London: Routledge, 2014b.
Povinelli, Elizabeth, Economies of Abandonment, Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
Radin, Margaret, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law, Princton: Princ-
eton UP, 2012.
Riles, Annelise, ‘A new agenda for the cultural study of law: Taking on the technicalities’, Buffalo 
Law Review, 63, 973-1033, 2005.
Riles, Annelise, ‘Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron 
Cage’, American Anthropologist, 108, 52–65, 2006.
Riles, Annelise, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Roitman, Janet, John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, ‘The Ethics of Illegality in the Chad Basin’, 
in Law and Disorder in the Postcolony, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.
Rose, Nikolas and Valverde, Mariana, ‘Governed by law?’, Social and Legal Studies, 7, 541-51, 
1998.
Scheffer, Thomas, Adversarial Case-Making: An Ethnography of an English Crown Court Procedure, 
Leiden: Brill, 2012.
Sassen, Saskia, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton: Princ-
eton UP, 2006.
Silbey, Susan S., ‘After Legal Consciousness’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 1, 323–368, 
2005. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115938.
Silbey, Susan. and Cavicchi, Ayn, ‘The common place of law: Transforming matters of concern 
into the objects of everyday life’, in B. Latour and P. Weibel (eds), Making Things Public: 
Atmospheres of Democracy, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005.
Silbey, Susan S. and Patricia Ewick, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Valverde, Mariana, Chronotopes of Law: Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance, London: Routledge, 
2014.
van Oorschot, Irene and Willem Schinkel, ‘The Legal Case File as Border Object: On Self- 
Reference and Other-Reference in Criminal Law’, Journal of Law and Society, 42, 499–527, 
2015.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2015.00723.x.
Woolgar, S. and J. Lezaun, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology 
Studies?’, Social Studies of Science, 43, 321–340, 2013.
